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Summary  findings
Imagine several mountain climbers, scaling a cliff face,  Safety net programs may intend to benefit only the
who want protection from falling. One way to protect  currently poor; programs to mitigate shocks ("safety
them would be to place a net at the bottom  of the cliff to  rope" programs) may intend to provide transfers to those
catch any climber just before he hits the ground. Another  whose incomes have fallen, even if they have not fallen
would be to provide a rope and a set of movable devices  below an absolute poverty threshold.
that can be attached to the cliff; as the climbers scale the  Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Pritchett examine the
cliff, they attach the rope at higher and higher levels so  targeting performance of two programs created to
that if a climber falls, he falls only by the length of the  respond to the social impacts of Indonesia's crisis.
rope.  They find strong evidence that one program,
In this paper, the "safety net" guarantees against a fall  subsidized sales of rice targeted to the permanently poor,
past an absolute level; the "safety rope" guarantees  was only weakly related to the shock in consumption
against a fall of more than a given distance. The safety  spending.
net is concerned with an increase in poverty; the safety  A job creation program was much more responsive to
rope mitigates risk through social insurance or social  changes in spending.
protection.  A household that started in the third quintile in
Calculations of the benefit incidence and targeting  expenditures in 1997 and fell to the lowest quintile
effectiveness of safety net programs typically examine  between 1997 and 1998 was four times as likely to have
only the relationship between a household's current  participated in the job creation program as a household
expenditures and program participation. But in programs  starting in the third quintile in 1997 but experiencing a
that respond to an economic shock or intend to mitigate  positive shock. But the household experiencing a
household risk, it is not only the current level of  negative shock was only 50 percent more likely to have
expenditures that matters but also changes in  received subsidized rice than a household experiencing a
expenditures.  positive shock.
This paper-a  product of the Environment and Social Development Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific  Region-is  part of
a larger effort in the region to improve the efficacy of response to the social impacts of the Indonesian crisis. Copies of the
paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Patricia Sader,
room MC3-556,  telephone 202-473-3902,  fax 202-522-1153,  email address psader@worldbank.org.  Policy Research
Working Papers are also posted  on  the Web at  www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  Lant  Pritchett  may be
contacted at lant_pritchett@harvard.edu.  September 2000.  (25 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work  in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
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countries they represent.
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(World Bank)Safety Nets and Safety Ropes:
Who Benefited  from Two Indonesian  Crisis Programs-
The "Poor" or the "Shocked?"'
l)  Introduction
Imagine a number of mountain  climbers scaling a sheer cliff face who,
understandably,  want protection  from falling. One method would be to employ a net
placed at the bottom of the cliff to catch any climber  just before they hit the ground.
Another method is to provide a rope and a set of movable  devices that can be attached
to the cliff so that as the climber scales the cliff they attach the rope at higher and
higher levels, and at any given time if a climber  falls they fall only by the length of
the rope. The "safety net" is a guarantee  against a fall past an absolute level, while
the "safety rope" is a guarantee  against a fall of more than a given distance. For
climbers very near the bottom the safety net provides reassurance,  but for those who
have made substantial  progress,  it is probably  small comfort that if they slip they will
lose all of their progress only to be caught at the very bottom.
While the metaphor  of the "social safety net" has become common,  it actually
confuses  two distinct issues. One is a concern for an increase in poverty, which as
typically measured  is the extent to which people are currently below a given level of
standard of living. The other is a concern for the mitigation of risk through "social
insurance" or "social protection,"  which is concerned with reducing the vulnerability
people face from the wide variety of shocks  households  face, whether or not these
shocks push households below some absolute level. This confusion in "social safety
We would like to thank BPS and UNICEF for access to the 100 villages data.
2nets" also extends to the economics  and political economy  of "safety net programs."
The reasons why a government,  either as a normative  or positive matter, might want
to implement  these programs  are completely  different. 2
In Indonesia, as the result of the "krismon" (krisis moneter or monetary crisis 3),
there were several new programs launched, widely  known as "JPS" (Jaring
Pengaman  Sosial or social safety net). The programs were intended to help protect
the traditionally  poor and newly poor suffering from the crisis in four areas: (a)
ensuring the availability  of food at affordable  prices for the poor, (b) supplementing
purchasing  power among  poor households  (HHs)  through employment  creation,  and
(c) preserving access of the poor to critical social services  such as health and
education,  and (d) sustain local economic  activity through regional block grant
programs and extension  of credit.
This note is not a comprehensive  evaluation  of the entire range of programs or
even a comprehensive  picture of the implementation  of the two programs we focus
on. In this paper, we only examine  the dynamic targeting  of two of these "JPS
programs," i.e. the "OPK" (Operasi  Pasar Khusus or special market operation)  - a
program of selling subsidized  rice to targeted  households  - and the "employment
creation program" (which was actually  a collection of many different programs
operated by different ministries).
The reminder of this note is organized as follows. Section  two discusses  the
programs and their method of targeting.  Section three briefly explains the source of
2  Economists  would recommend  poverty  programs  to a hypothetical  benign social welfare maximizer
if the social welfare function was built up from individual  (household)  utility functions  with declining
marginal  utility in which case a (costless)  transfer from rich to poor is not a Pareto improvement  by
does raise social welfare. There is also an argument  for poverty  programs  from an externality  in
altruism. In contrast  the normative  case for government  involvement  in mitigation  of risk is based on
the argument that, if moral hazard and adverse  selection  are sufficiently  large then welfare improving
markets for insurance  against these risks will not exist (and they will be "too small" in any case). This
3the data, i.e. the '100 Villages Survey'. Section four discusses  method used in
evaluating  the targeting effectiveness  and the main findings, and finally section five
provides conclusions.
IH) The programs and their method of targeting
The two key social safety net programs analyzed  in this study use different
targeting  methods. The households  eligible for the OPK (cheap rice) program was.
based on the family planning agency (BKKBN)  list of households  by "welfare" status.
*In  this classification,  HHs are grouped into four socio-economic  status: 'pre-
prosperous' ("keluarga pra-sejahtera"  or KPS), 'prosperous level I, II or III'
("keluarga sejahtera " or KS I, KS II, and KS III) based on a range of variables (food
consumption,  type of floor, type of health care services,  clothing, and religious
practices) as assessed by local BKKBN  Kader (family planning cadres). The KS I to
KS III categories  are often lumped  together as KS (or 'prosperous') category. In past
years, eligible recipients  for some JPS programs are only KPS card holders, but for
OPK eligibility  was extended  to include KS I HHs as well. At the present  time under
the OPK program,  each eligible  HH is allowed  to purchase  20 kilograms of rice per
month at a highly subsidized  price of Rp. 1,000/kg,  but during the period covered by
the data (Aug-Dec. 1998)  the amount  at this price was only 10 kg per HH. The
market price for medium quality rice in October  to November 1998  period was
around Rp. 2,500/kg. 4 The magnitude  of the subsidy  was therefore roughly Rp.
15,000/HH/month  (compared  to the total HH expenditures  at the 20h percentile of Rp.
is potentially  the case in a wide variety of ins,urance  markets-but  particularly  affect the market for
insurance  of incomes.
3 Actually it was a combination  simultaneous  financial,  economic, natural and political crises.
4 Rahayu, Sri Kusumastuti  et al (1998),  Results of a SMERU  Rapid Field Appraisal Mission:
Implementation  of Special Market Operation  (OPK)  Program in Five Provinces, SMERU Special
Report,  December, Social  Monitoring  & Early  Response  Unit, Jakarta.
4232,000/month).  The program  began in August 1998 and was brought up to roughly
full scale in terms of HH coverage  by the time of the Dec 1998  round of the survey.
The four major criticisms  of using BKKBN  list for targeting are that (a) it does
not capture transitory shocks  to income as it is based on relatively fixed assets (like
having a floor not made of earth, owning changes  of clothing);  (b) it includes non-
economic  criteria (e.g. family able to meet religious  obligations);  c) the list is
compiled  by relatively low trained workers at the village level so consistency  across
regions is not assured; and d) the list is susceptive  to changes  by local government
officials.5
Of course in practice the targeting  mechanism  was not always implemented  as
specified in the rules. BULOG (the National Logistic Agency) made the amounts  of
rice available at the Dolog (Logistic Depot) and Sub-Dolog  offices  based on the
eligibility lists, but the actual distribution  of the rice to HHs within the localities was
carried out by local officials. Numerous  field visits report  that in some areas local
decision-makers  felt pressure from communities  to change the distribution  of rice
from the designated "eligible" HHs to other HHs which were deemed equally
deserving or to the entire community. A commonly heard argument  was that since all
the community  was expected  to contribute  to community  endeavors  (e.g. gotong
royong or "self-help") that all should benefit equally from the "windfall" assistance
from the central government.  In many cases the rice was divided up equally among all
households, so that KPS and KS I HHs received  less rice and some was also received
by households with higher living standards. 6 This diversion  from one set of HHs to
5A  criticism that is particularly important  in Jakarta (and some other  major cities) is that the list may
only include those with a valid identification  card (KTP) for that location.  Since these KTPs are
difficult to obtain a large fraction  of the poor would be excluded by this creteria.
6 See Suryahadi  et al (1999).
5others is in addition  to less frequent  reports of the rice being diverted from HH
distribution altogether  and sold on the local market.
The other JPS "program"  we examine  was not a single  program but a large set
of activities under the name of padat karya (which means, as an adjective,  "labor
intensive").  These were created  as a response  to the threat of burgeoning
unemployment  because of economic  contraction  which had forced many firms to
either lay off part of their workers  or shutdown  completely. In accordance  with the.
urban nature of the crisis, the initial geographical  targets for the first round of "crash"
programs were directed  to urban areas plus some rural areas  which experienced
harvest failures. In FY 1998/99 there was a proliferation  of programs and there were
more than a dozen different programs  which fall into this "employment  creation"
category,  which can be classified into four types. First, some programs  were a
redesigning  of on-going investment  and infrastructure  projects into more labor
intensive type project. Second,  other programs gave modes of contracting  and block
grants to local communities  (such as the Kecamatan  Development,  Village
Infrastructure,  and PDM-DKE  Programs).  These funds were directed  to poorer areas,
and had 'menus' for the utilization  of the funds  that included  the possibility of public
works with a labor creating  effect. A third set were special labor intensive work
(forestry, rural-urban,  retraining  of laid off workers).  A fourth type of program were
"food for work" programs usually launched  by international  donors and NGOs in the
drought stricken areas.
Unlike the OPK, the collection  of padat karya programs  were quite diverse and
although specific programs were targeted to areas (e.g. drought)  the lack of
coordination  meant there was little or no systematic  geographic  targeting of the set of
programs overall. Within programs there were a variety of criteria  used but typically
6the beneficiaries were not chosen according to fixed administration  criteria. To the
extent there was targeting, it was primarily  through self-selection. Only those who
were willing to work should  have been able to receive  the benefit. This self-selection
mechanism has the advantage  over administrative  criteria of allowing individuals  to
choose to participate  or not and creates the possibility of being more flexible to
unobserved HH shocks.
In practice, however, there were several problems. First, the programs were not
rigorously held to a minimum  wage, and in many cases the programs would raise
wages (or would shorten hours for the same wage) to attract  workers. In some regions,
the wage rate was set at higher rate than the prevailing  local wage rate, and thus
inducing the already working people to switch  jobs.  Second,  at least in some
anecdotal evidence,  workers  were not actually held to working. Field investigations
uncovered  evidence of "ghost workers,"  who were present  on the records as being
paid for the day but not present on the site. Third, reports from the field also
indicated other shortcomings  in selection  of beneficiaries,  such as favoritism in
giving jobs to the close family and friends of local officials.
So, in design (as of December 1998)  the OPK eligibility  was based on an
administrative  criteria of the BKKBN  list, which was (more or less) fixed by the
kaders survey of HHs in January 1998,  while the participation  in any of the padat
karya programs was based on self-selection. In practice,  both programs had a variety
of deviations from this design and the actual targeting  with respect to households
expenditures and poverty status. It is a matter for empirical inquiry  using the HH data.
III)  Data:  The 100 Village  Survey
7Data. The 100 Village Survey  ("Survei Seratus  Desa" or SSD) was sponsored
by UNICEF  and carried  out by BPS. The SSD  collected data from 12,000  HHs,
covering 100 'villages' (desa), located  in 10 districts (kabupaten),  spread  across 8
provinces. The SSD surveyed 120 HHs in each of the 100 villages in each round of
the survey. 7 This study utilizes  the data from three rounds:  May 1997,  August 1998,
and December 1998. The SSD sample,  while quite large, was not designed  to be
statistically  representative  of the country  and are geographically  quite concentrated,
located  in only 10 of the country's over 300 districts.
The survey  areas were chosen in 1994,  before the crisis, based on a purposive
sampling  approach  to capture  various types of villages  that were 'representative' of
various parts of the rural economy. Since  the areas were chosen before the crisis,
there is no reason to suspect  the sampling  was influenced  by the crisis. On the other
hand, this survey  was meant to focus  on rural  and relatively poor areas, so we know in
advance it is not representative  of the entire country  in levels.' How representative  it
is of the changes due to the recent shock  is impossible  to know. 9 Until this data can
be matched  with analysis  of the new national  data on JPS from SUSENAS 1999,  it is
impossible  to say how 'representative'  the impact  of the crisis in the areas might be.
However,  there is little reason to believe  these two JPS programs differed
substantially  or systematically  in these areas from other parts of the country.
The December 1998  round of SSD has a module  on respondent's  awareness and
participation  in various  JPS programs. The households  were asked if they had
"participated"  in these programs  in the period since August  31It  1998, so the recall
7 See Suryahadi  and Sumarto  (1999)  for more  details.
8 The HHs sampled are not even representative  in levels  of the population  within  the 10 districts  of the
sample.  In this sample there are 49 percent 'pre-prosperous'  HHs, while the same districts  have only 26
percent 'pre-prosperous' HHs.
Although  evidence  presented  in an earlier  paper suggests  reasonably  close correspondence  of
estimates  of changes in national  poverty  rates. See Suryahadi  and Sumarto  (1999).
8period is roughly three months. The exact questions  of this module in Bahasa
Indonesia  together with their English  translation  are presented  in the annex  A. There
are two unfortunate  aspects  of the data. First, the questions  do not allow  precise
identification  of the specific  programs  as it does not allow  us to determine  in which of
the many  padat karya programs a HH may have participated. Also, the SSD
questionnaire  inquires  only about the receipt of Sembako  ("basic necessities")  and
does not identify  particularly  the OPK program  as there are other sources  such as
private charities  (e.g. religious  activities,  NGOs).  While OPK accounts for the vast
majority  of Sembako  and hence we believe  the data reflects primarily  the OPK
program,  we can not be more precise. Second,  there is no indication  of the extent of
participation  or magnitude  of benefits,  so for instance there is no indication  of the
number of days of  padat karya labor nor of the amount  of rice received (which varied
widely depending  on the distribution  rule in the local community).
Data on JPS participation  from the December 1998  round were combined  with
expenditure  data from the May 1997  and August 1998  rounds, so that it can be
evaluated  whether  JPS participation  in the period of September  to December 1998  is
correlated  or not with levels and changes  of expenditures  in May 1997 and August
1998.  Although the number  of samples  in each round is fixed  at 12,000  HHs, due to
sample replacements  there are only 6,200 HHs that can be identified  as the same  HHs
interviewed  in all the three rounds.  The process of HH matching  itself was quite
problematic due to the lack of unique identification  code  across rounds. Hence,  the
matching  (within each  village) had to rely on the names  of HH heads, controlled  by
demographic  variables.
To make the level of expenditures  in August 1998  comparable  with May 1997,
a deflator was recalculated  from the consumer  price index (CPI) data between the two
9periods. The CPI has a food share of around 40 percent, which is underestimating  the
imnportance  of food for poorer HHs. Based on the consumption  data in the May 1997
round, the deflator used in this study has a food share of 68 percent. 10
I)  Methods and Results
Since our approach extends  static benefit incidence  with information  on
changes,  we start with the basic procedure  of calculating  quintiles of expenditures  in
May 1997 and August 1998 and quintiles of the change in expenditures. The changes
are calculated  such that a negative  number implies a fall in incomes so the smallest
quintile are those whose expenditures  fell the most between the two surveys. We then
calculate  the proportion  of households  who report  "participating"  in either the
sembako or the  padat karya in December 1998. The existence  of the panel data
allows us to track participation  in the JPS programs in two ways. The first uses the
"transition matrix" and examines  participation  not only according  to which quintile
the households  expenditures  were in 1998, but also on how the HH arrived in that
expenditure  quintile,  that is, where the HH was in 1997. The second takes a HHs
expenditures  in 1997 and examines  how the shock experienced  by the HH determined
the likelihood  of program participation.
A)  Targeting and the Transition  Matrix
Appendix Table A.  1 shows the results of the transition  matrix approach for
sembako. The top row shows the result of the static benefit incidence calculation. Of
those in the bottom quintile in 1998  (QI-98)  52.7 percent received  sembako, while this
was 42.3 percent for the middle (third)  quintile, and only 20.7 for the richest quintile.
10  More  discussion  on  the appropriate  deflators  for  Indonesia  during  the crisis  can  be found  in
Suryahadi  and Sumarto (1999).
10This suggests  substantial, but far from perfect targeting. The first column shows how
well the programn  was targeted  if we judged it solely  by the HHs expenditures in May
1997. The program is actually  slightly  more sharply targeted on May 1997
expenditures  than on August 1998  expenditures,  with participation  falling from 59.8
(QI-97) to 20.6 (QV-97)  percent.
But the classification  of households  by either quintiles in 1997 or quintiles in
1998 does not utilize the panel nature of the data that allows us to track the
households over time. The "transition matrix" shows  which households  moved
quintiles, for example,  were in QI in 1997 and then QII in 1998 (and hence rose in
relative ranking) or which HHs fell in ranking  from QIII in 1997  to QI in 1998.  The
numbers of HHs in each cell presented in table B.1 in appendix B.
The cells of the table in A.  1 record  the participation  in the programs by each of
the 25 possible combinations  of quintiles. So of the 335 households who were in QIII
in each period, 44.5 percent received  sembako;  of the 152  HHs who were in QIII in
1997 but fell into Q I in 1998,  only 42.1 percent received sembako;  while of the 191
HHs from QIII in 1997  who rose into the top quintile  (QV) in 1998, only 24.6 percent
received sembako.
Since the transition  matrix contains a wealth of information,  in order to
summarize  the data and to make the results comparable  across the two programs, we
have summarized  that information  in three ways.
* The second number in each cell under the participation  rate in bold
text, is the ratio of participation  of that cell of the transition  matrix relative to
those who were in the poorest quintile in both periods. So, proceeding down
the diagonal of those were in the same quintile  in each period,  Q1197-QI198
participation  was 90 percent that of Q197-QI98,  while QIII-97-Q1198  was 76
11percent, and down  to QV97-QV98  where participation  was only 27 percent
that of the Q187-QI98  households.
*  The third number  in each cell (in italics) is the ratio of participation  in
that cell to the total participation  of the same  quintile in 1998. Average
participation  of Q1198  was 47.9 percent, but of those in the second
quintile in 1998 who came from the first quintile  in 1997  (QI97-QI198)
63.1 percent received  sembako,  so the ratio is 1.32, while of those with
the same (measured)  expenditures  in 1998  in the second  quintile, but
whom were in the fifth quintile in 1997  (QV97-QI198)  only 27 percent
received  sembako, so the ratio with Q1198  average is .56.
*  The last entry in each cell is similar, as it is the ratio of the cell
participation  to the average for that quintile  in 1997 expenditures. So HHs
in Q11197  had average  participation  of 40.1 ranging  from 46.9 (ratio = 1.17)
for Q11197-QI198  to only .61 (= 24.6/40.1)  for Q11197-QV98.
The same  method is applied  to the padat karya  programs and the results are
presented  in Appendix Table A.2.
B)  Targeting and Household expenditure  "shock"
Even clearer than the transition  matrices  are the classification  of households  by
their "pre-crisis"  level of expenditure  and the "shock." Tables A.3 and A.4 repeat the
analysis  in tables A.  1 and A.2 respectively  with the but with quintiles of expenditures
in 1997 as one axis and the other axis is by quintiles  of change  in (natural log)
expenditures between  1997 and 1998.11
' The numbers of HHs in each cell are presented  in table B2 in annex B.
12Comparing tables A.3 and A.4 show the real differences in the program as
regards the "safety net" versus "safety rope" aspects.  Take the households who,
before the crisis, were in the middle of the expenditure distribution, Q11197,  and then
examine how the shock to those HH' s expenditures affected their participation in the
two JPS programs.  The average receipt for sembako for those HHs in Q11197  was
40.1 percent.  Those with the worst shock were only slightly more likely to receive
sembako, with participation  rate of 42.4 (ratio of 1.06).  Interestingly, those
beginning in QIII-97 with a slightly less severe shock (QII-Shock and QIII-Shock)
actually were actually more likely than those with the worst shock to receive
sembako, with participation ratios relative to the average for the quintile of 1.20 and
1.11 respectively.  Even those with the best shock (whose measured expenditures
actually increased) were only modestly less likely to receive sembako than were the
worst affected households, so that the ratio of worst to least shock participation was
only 1.58, i.e. the worst affected were only 58 percent more likely to receive sembako
than the least affected group.
In contrast, in the padat karya, those who began in the middle group in 1997
(QIII-97) were less likely on average to participate than were the poorest QI-97, as
23.1 percent of QI-97 participated versus only 40 percent of that (9.4 percent) of QIII-
97.  This is sharper targeting based on  1997 than OPK, where the similar ratio is .7.
What is ever more striking is the extent to which a shock to expenditures affects the
likelihood of padat karya participation, as those who began in the middle but suffered
the worst quintile of shock (QI1197-QlShock) had a participation rate of 18.9 percent
(almost as high as the QI-97 average of 23.1).  In contrast, those from the middle who
experienced the best change in expenditures (QIII-97, QV-Shock) had a participation
13rate of only 5.3 percent. This implies that the worst hit were over 300 percent more
likely to participate  inpadat karya than the least hit.
These comparative  results are summarized  in table 1 and figures 1 and 2. Table
1 summarize  the information  from the appendix  tables to show the two programs side
by side with all the participation  rates relative  to the "worst" cell, QI-97,  QI-98 in the
upper half of table 1 or QI-97,  QI-Shock  in the lower half of the table. This shows the
"targeting slopes" in both dimensions  - either expenditures 1997 and expenditures
1998 or expenditures 1997 and the change in expenditures.
Table 1: Summary comparison  of targeting  between sembako and  padat karya
Quintiles by level of expenditures  in  Ratio of
1998  QV to QI
I  III  V
(Poorest)  (Richest)
I  Sembako  1.00  1.17  0.69  0.69
(Poorest)  Padat  1.00  0.47  0.42  0.42
cz  Karya
III  Sembako  0.72  0.76  0.42  0.58
Padat  0.66  0.27  0.12  0.18
_____  .Karya
V  Sembako  0.63  0.41  0.27  0.43
(Richest)  Padat  1.12  0.24  0.06  0.05
Karya
Quintiles  by "shock": change in  Ratio of
expenditures  1997 to 1998  QV to QI
I  III  V
(Worst  (Positive
Affected)  Shock)
I  Sembako  1.00  0.98  1.12  1.12
(Poorest)  Padat  1.00  0.38  0.38  0.38
_____  Karya
n  .=  III  Sembako  0.75  0.79  0.48  0.64
Padat  0.40  0.16  0.11  0.28
i____  Karya_
V  Sembako  0.40  0.30  0.30  0.75
(Richest)  Padat  0.19  0.07  0.04  0.21
Karya
Source: Derived from appendix  tables A.1-A.4.
14Padat karya is far and away more targeted "steeper"  with respect to the shock
for all groups of initial income. The final column of table shows the ratio of the
program participation rate for QV-Shock to QI-Shock for each of the groups.  So
while for the poor (QI-97) the ratio is 1.12 for sembako (those least affected actually
got more), forpadat  karya  the ratio is .38.  For the richest group (QV-97) those that
has the best shock were almost certain not to participate in padat karya with a rate of
only 1.7 percent, only 4 percent of that of the worst (QI-97, QI-Shock) cell, while for
the sembako the "best" group the rate is still 30 percent of that for the worst group.
We summarize this tabublar information graphically in two ways.  The panels
of Figure 1 show the comparison across different magnitudes of shock for different
quintiles of initial expenditures in 1997.  Figure  1  a shows the likelihood of receiving
sembako or participating  inpadat  karya for those who were poor in 1997 (QI-97)
relative to those with the worst shock (QI-Shock).  (The participation rate is
normalized to 1 for both programs so that the graph compares just  targeting (relative
partcipation rates) and not average program participation.)  For this quintile the
difference in the two programs is striking, as the least affected group (whose
expenditures rose) was more likely to receive sembako than the least affected group
while participation inpadat  karya fell uniformly.
15Figure  Ia: Probability  of Poor Households  in 1997
Receiving  Sembako  and Participating  in Padat Karya,  by
quintile  of Shock
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Figures  lb and 1  c show the same comparison for those who were in the
middle (QIII-97) and top (QV-97) groups.  Since participation rates are still relative to
the worst group (QI-97, QI-Shock) these graphs show two features.  First,
participation is higher for sembako for every group, suggesting that this is less sharply
targeted by initial income.  Second, for both expenditure groups the drop is sharper by
Figure 1c:  Probability  of Non-Poor  Households  in 1997
Receiving  Sembako  and Participating  in Padat Kary, by
Quintile of Shock.
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Figure ib:  Probability of Middle Quintile Households in
1997  Receiving Sembako and Participating in Padat
Karya, by quintile of Shock.
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ISsrmbako  EPadatKara|lthe extent of the shock-so padat karya is also much more  targeted  by the extent of
the shock households  experienced  than is sembako.
Figures 2a and 2b show the same  information  in a three dimensional  bar chart
for each program. If this graph looks confusing-skip it. If it looks cool, here is how
to read it. The slope coming  towards  the reader is the degree  of targeting  with respect
to 1997  levels. The slope across the graph (left to right) is the targeting  with respect
to shock. The overall  targeting  is the slope from back left corner (which cell (QI-97,
QI-shock)  is normalized  to 1 in both graphs)  for front right corner.  It is obvious  that
considered  in both dimensions  the  padat karya were much  more  targeted than
sembako.
C)  Targeting, Insurance, and Budget Allocations
From the government  point of view, it is important  to assess the efficiency  of a
program  by evaluating  which groups  actually  receive  most of the budget. The first
step in this is to estimate  how much  of a given  budget  which is received  by
beneficiaries  is received  by various groups. However,  we have no information  on
how large the benefits were from either program  as we neither know the anount of
rice received  nor the number  of days worked. Therefore  in this sub-section  we
estimate  an elaborate  hypothetical. We ask if a total amount  of benefits  were to be
distributed  according  the targeting  pattern of sembako  versus  according  to the
targeting  pattern of  padat karya, what is the expected  amount  that would be received
by each group and how much of the budget  would go to individuals  in the various
groups  by initial income and shock.
17Suppose  there were a budget to be costlessly  distributed  to the 6,200 individuals
in the sample  that was adequate  to provide  each HH 10,000  rupiah per month2. We
compare  three possible allocations. First, a uniforn allocation  so that every HH
receives  exactly  the same amount  irrespective  of initial income and shock. Second,
distributed  according  to the targeting  pattern of sembako,  assuming every  HH who
"participates"  receives exactly  the same amount. Third, distributed  according  to the
targeting  pattern of  padat karya again with the assumption  of equal distribution.
We need to stress  that all of these calculations  are  hypothetical  because  in fact
the costs of delivering  a dollar's worth of benefits via a  padat karya is much much
higher  than through a simple in-kind  income transfer  program  like OPK but it also
delivers  other, non-transfer,  benefits. So there are at least  three elements  to a choice
between an actual employment  creation  scheme  and an actual  subsidized  rice scheme.
First, there are other costs to labor  creation so only a fraction of the benefits accrue to
labor. Second,  the gross benefit to workers  is not the net benefit, which must account
for the foregone  wage. Third, the  padat karya may actually  create  useful investments
that deliver benefits  to poor and non-poor. Our concern  here is just on the targeting
pattern.
Table 2 shows the expected  amount  that would be received  by a person in each
group.  This expected  arnount  is the amount to be received  per household,  conditional
on household  participation  (which  is the total budget for the program divided  by the
total number of participants)  times the number  of recipients  in each cell divided by the
total number  in that cell (which is the likelihood  of participation).  For the uniforn
transfer,  this is easy:  the total is 62 million,  there are 6200 households,  so the per
recipient  amount is 10,000  and all households  in each cell participate  so the expected
12 This more or less arbitrary figure is chosen  because  if the total development  budget for safety  nets in
FY 99/2000  of 5.6 trillion rupiah  were distributed  to each of the country's 45 million  households
18amount  is 10,000. For the sembako  targeting  scheme  (note this is not the actual
sembako  scheme but a hypothetical)  the number  of participants  is 2377 of 6200 so the
transfer  per recipient  would be 62 million*  (6200/2377)=Rp.  26081, which is true for
all participants. Then  take the first cell, 248 of the 441 people in this cell participated
so the expected  value is the amount  time the chance of participating,  which is
26081  *(248/441)-Rp. 14,658. Since  for  padat karya the overall participation  is
lower,  the amount  per recipient  is higher  at Rp 69,815  while the participation  in the
first cell is 208 of 441 so the expected  value is Rp. 32,928.  (An equivalent  procedure
for comparing  the programs would  have been to scale up  padat karya participation  to
the sembako  level on average,  producing  equivalent  expected  values across  this table).
Insurance  is a contingent  contract  that pays off different  amounts  depending  the
realization  of some outcome. So if my house does not burn down the payout on fire
insurance  is zero while if my house  does burn down  my payout is the value of the
house. How do this programs stack  up as a "safety  rope" or insurance  against  a
negative  shock? This table shows the trade-offs  from a potential  recipients  point of
view. While the likelihood  of receiving  sembako is higher  for every group, this also
means that the total amount  must be spread  over a larger group so the more even the
distribution  across the population  the less the amount available  per person.  In
contrast,  padat karya pays out more in bad states  than good states.
Suppose  I were in some Rawlsian  condition  of ignorance and I did not know
which state (e.g. my wealth or shock) I would be in, which would I prefer? If I am
completely  risk average, I don't care as the expected  value for all programs is 10,000
for each. But if I am sufficiently  risk averse  I would  prefer the  padat karya pattern to
the sembako pattern to the uniform  transfer  because if I have the worst outcome  I
equally this would provide  10,370 rupiah per HH per month.
19receive 22,000  under that pattern  while only 12,000  under the sembako  pattern and
only 10,000. With the second to worse shock  I receive  more, while with all other
shocks  I receive less from that program.
Now suppose  that I do know  which quintile  I am in but do not know what my
shock  will be like, then which program  do I prefer? Now there are two effects,  a level
of expenditures  effect and a risk effect. If I am poor even with modest  risk aversion  I
prefer  padat karya pattern because  I get more on average and I get more when I have
a negative  shock so the program  has superior  transfer and insurance functions. If I am
in quintile  IV then (in the absence  of altruism)  I prefer  the uniform  over the sembako
over thepadat karya pattern because  I receive  more in every  state in uniform  than
sembako,  sembako than  padat karya.  The  middle group (Q-III)  is interesting,  as the
pay-outs in the worst shock are higher but the payouts on average are much lower
(6,824 versus 10,571). If I am very risk averse (and hence have a very large desire  to
reallocate  resources from good to bad states)  I might preferpadat karya even though
the payouts in the good states are so low.
20Table 2: Expected  value received by households  in various groups, according  to quintile of expenditures  in 1997
and shock for a hypothetical  program following  either  uniform distribution  of the sembako orpadat karya pattern of
targeting.
Quintiles  of shock
(change  in natural  log expenditures)
Average  I  II  |  II  IV  V
across  shock  l
Average across all Quintiles of 1997
Uniform  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000(  10,000  10,000
Sembako  10,000  11,977  11,867  1  0,68  6  8,713  6,757
Padat Karya  10,000  22,399  12,194  6,204[  5,624  3,579
Quintile I of 1997 Expenditures
I  1Uniforn  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000
I  Sembako  14,708  14,658  13,537  14,293  16,588  16,432
1  ]Padat Karya  22,713  33,023  23,109  12,567  14,103  12,497
Quintile II
II  Uniform  10,000  10,000T  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000
II  Sembako  12,506  13,4061  13,563  13,041  11,372  8,946
11  Padat Karya  14,7521  29,5321  15,010  6,2141  9 ,42s  9,146
Quintile III
III  |Uniform  10,000  10,0001  10,000  10,000  10,000  10,000
III  ISembako  10,571  11,059|  12,545  11,606  9,624  6,964
III  {Padat  Karya  6,824  13,1951  5,934  5,236  6,283  3,700
|________________  ___________  Q  uintile IV
IV  lUniform  10,000  10,0001  10,0001  10,000°  10,000l  10,000
IV  |Sembako  7,580  8,1111  9,7291  8,5291  6,6901  5,973
IV  ]Padat  Karya  3,974  6,4931  6,0041  4,7471  2,9321  1,606
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  Q uintile V  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  I
v  Uniform  1  0,000  10,0,0000  10,000  10,000  10,000
V  Sembako  4,6351  5,8681  6,3121  4,3821  3,782  4,408
IV X7jPadat  Karya  f  r  1,7371  6,283  1,7451  2,304]  461  1,187
Notes: Author's calculations  based on appendix  table A.  I -A.4 and B.  I
From  a policy  point  of view,  if one  is imagining  normative  recommendations
to a benign  social  planner  who  is maximizing  a social  welfare  function  with
"inequality  aversion"  then  the padat  karya  pattern  of benefits  would  be preferred
because  if both reaches  the  poor  more  effectively  and  has the  added  benefit  of
reaching  those  with  a bad  shock  to income.  Table  3 examines  the proportion  of the
budget  that  goes  to the  various  groups,  which  is a product  of the  targeting  and  the
distribution  across  groups.  In the padat  karya  pattern  45 percent  of the  budget  goes  to
those  with  the worst  shock  and  (conincidentally)  45 percent  of  the budget  goes  to
21those  in the  bottom  quintile.  In sembako  pattern  of targeting,  only  24 percent  goes  to
the worst shocked,  while 30 percent goes to those in the bottom quintile.
Table 3: Proportion  of budget  delivered  to beneficiaries  under  various targeting  patterns.
Quintiles  by shock
(change  in per capita  expenditures)
Average  I  1I  11  IVV
across  all
Shocks
Uniform  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.0
Sembako  24.01  23.7  21.4  17.4  13.5
Padat Karya  44.8  24.4  12.4  11.2  7.2
Quintile  1 1997
_____  Uniform  20.0  7.1  5.1  3.5  2.5  1.8
I____  Sembako  29.4  10.41  6.9  5.0  4.1  3.0
I____  Padat Karya  45.4  23.51  11.8  4.4  3.5  2.3
Quintile  11  1997
II  Uniform  20.01  4.61  5.3  4.4  3  .6  2.2
LI  Sembako  25.0  6.1  7.1  5.71  4.1  2.0
11  Padat Karya  29.5  13.51  7.9  2.7  3.4  2.0
Quintile  III 1997
III  IUniform  20.0  3.7  4.11  5.0  4.2  3.1
III  Sembako  21.1  4.1  5.21  5.8  4.0  2.1
III  Padat Karya  13.6  4.9  2.4j  2.6  2.6  1.1
Quintile  IV 1997
IV  Uniform  20.01  2.71  3.11  4.31  5.2  4.7
IV  Sembako  15.2  2.21  3.01  3 71  3 5  2.8
IV  Padat Karya  7.91  1.8|  1.8|  20[  15  0.7
Quintile  V 1997
V  Uniform  r  20.0  1.9  2.5  2.9  4.5  8.2
V  Sembako  1  9.31  1.1|  1.5  1.3  1.7|  3.6
V  Padat Karya  1_  3.51  1.21  0.41  0.71  0.21  1.0
Notes: Author's calculations  based  on appendix  tables A.1-A.4  and B.1
22V) Conclusions
The findings  of this study  point out that two of major "JPS' programs  pursued a
different  method of targeting. We find strong  evidence  that one of the programs, a
subsidized  sale of rice, while  it was targeted  to the "permanently"  poor was not
related  to the "shock" in income. This illustrates  the trade-offs  both from a policy and
positive  political economy  point of view of different  types of programs.
On the other hand, "padat karya"  programs  was targeted  to both levels and
shocks  to expenditures. This pattern of targeting  is of course  just one piece of the
puzzle, as the costs per dollar of benefits  delivered  to any recipient are much higher
for an employment  scheme.
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24Appendix A
Table A.1:  Households  in "100 villages" data who received "Sembako"  in the
three months prior to December 1998,  by quintile of per capita  household
expenditures  in August 1998,  May 1997,  and transition  matrix between 1997  and
1998.
August 1998  Expenditure  Quintiles
I  III  IV  V
Totals  52.7  47.9  42.3  33.1  20.7
1998  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.4
Totals
1997
I  59.8  58.6  63.1  68.6  44.9  40.6
(Poorest)  1.0  1.00  1.08  1.17  0.77  0.69
1.11  1.32  1.62  1.36  1.96
0.98  1.06  1.15  0.75  0.68
11  45.2  50.50  52.70  42.60  35.90  28.70
0.8  0.86  0.90  0.73  0.61  0.49
0.96  1.10  1.01  1.08  1.39
1.12  1.17  0.94  0.79  0.63
oII  40.1  42.10  46.90  44.50  37.80  24.60
0.7  0.72  0.80  0.76  0.65  0.42
0.80  0.98  1.05  1.14  1.19
iL  1.05  1.17  1.11  0.94  0.61
IV  31.1  39.50  27.80  36.00  33.00  23.70
0.5  0.67  0.47  0.61  0.56  0.40
co  0.75  0.58  0.85  1.00  1.14
1.27  0.89  1.16  1.06  0.76
V  20.6  37.04  27.00  24.06  24.30  15.80
(Richest)  0.3  0.63  0.46  0.41  0.41  0.27
0.70  0.56  0.57  0.73  0.76
1.80  1.31  1.17  1.18  0.77
Notes:
Bold: Ratio of HHs participating  in that cell that of QI 1998/QI 1997 (e.g. bottom
rightmost cell 15.8/58.6=.27)
Italics: Ratio HHs participating  in that cell to average for that quintile in 1998 (e.g.
bottom rightmost  cell 15.8/20.7=.76)
Plain text: Ratio of HHs participating  in that cell to average  for that quintile in 1997
(e.g. bottom rightmost  cell 15.8/20.6=.77)
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